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4 Can and should misappropriation also
protect databases? A comparative approach
Estelle Derclaye1
Introduction
Article 13 of the Database Directive2 provides that
[t]he Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning in particular . . .
unfair competition. . . .
It therefore allows Member States to protect databases by unfair competi-
tion law in addition to the sui generis right. In other words, database produc-
ers can protect their databases by the sui generis right and unfair competition
simultaneously if their national laws allow it. This chapter aims at discovering
whether this additional protection against unfair competition over-protects
databases and if it does, remedies are suggested. It is concerned only with the
database right, which protects the investment in collecting, verifying or
presenting data, and not copyright, which protects the structure of the data-
base. Over-protection exists when the same subject-matter (here investment in
databases) is protected more than once by similar types of protection at the
same time. I call this type of over-protection ‘simultaneous over-protection’.3
It is against the intellectual property paradigm that an effort be rewarded
twice. More protection leads to rent-seeking and all the negative effects of
monopolies. Over-protection must therefore be avoided. This chapter exam-
ines the protection of databases against parasitism.4 Unfair competition acts
83
1 Lecturer in Law, University of Nottingham.
2 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the legal protection of databases, OJ L77/20, 27.03.1996 (‘the Directive’).
3 Two other types also exist. There is a posteriori over-protection if the intel-
lectual property protection has expired but the database can still be protected against
parasitism and there is negative over-protection when no intellectual property protec-
tion is available at all but the action for parasitism is. These are examined in the
author’s thesis (2008), The Legal Protection of Databases: A Comparative Analysis,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
4 The terms, the ‘theory of parasitism’, ‘tort of parasitism’ and ‘parasitism’ will
be used interchangeably. Parasitism is also commonly known as slavish imitation, slav-
ish copying or misappropriation depending on the country. For the purposes of this
other than parasitism, such as disparagement, trade secret protection or
misleading advertising, are not aimed at protecting investment but at protect-
ing reputation, secrecy or guarding against false allegations. Thus, there is no
cumulation as the subject-matters protected under the two laws are different.
Unfair competition law is not harmonised in Europe. Therefore, national laws
must be reviewed. Analysis of the law of a few Member States is sufficient to
prove there is, at least in some, over-protection. To this aim, the laws of the
United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Belgium have been chosen.
Before tackling the issue of simultaneous over-protection, a broad
overview of the unfair competition legal framework in Europe is in order.
1. Unfair competition in Europe
Unfair competition in the European Union remains largely unharmonised.5
So far only two acts of unfair competition, namely misleading and compara-
tive advertising, have been harmonised.6 Despite this lack of harmonisation,
each Member State must comply with articles 1–12 and 19 of the 1967
version of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883 as required by article 2 of TRIPs.7 Article 10bis of the Paris Convention
states:
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commer-
cial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
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chapter, the word ‘parasitism’ will be chosen to refer to all these concepts because it is
the term most used in France and Belgium.
5 Henning-Bodewig, F. and G. Schricker (2002), ‘New initiatives for the
harmonisation of unfair competition law in Europe’, EIPR 271–2.
6 Council Directive 84/450/CEE of 10 September 1984 relating to the approxi-
mation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning misleading advertising, OJ L250/17, 19.09.1984 and Directive 97/55/EC of
Parliament and Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC concern-
ing misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising,OJ L290/18,
23.10.1997. See also the regulation of advertising in Council Directive 89/552/EEC of
3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation
or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broad-
casting activities, OJ L298, 17.10.1989, p. 23. See also G. Schricker (1991), ‘European
harmonisation of unfair competition law – a futile venture’, IIC 788; Henning-Bodewig
and Schricker, above fn. 5, pp. 271–2.
7 TRIPs has no special section on unfair competition and it refers to it only in
places, namely in article 39 on the protection of undisclosed information and article
22.2.b in the section on geographical indications.
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever
with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activi-
ties, of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a
competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable
to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the char-
acteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
Parasitism is not mentioned in the illustrative list of article 10bis(3).8 It can
only be prohibited under article 10bis(2). However, there is no further defini-
tion of what is an act of unfair competition beyond an act contrary to honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters. Therefore, the Convention does
not force Member countries to prohibit parasitism. Since there is neither inter-
national nor European harmonisation of parasitism, it is still regulated on a
purely national basis.
2. Misappropriation and parasitism
2.1. The United Kingdom and Ireland
The legal concepts of unfair competition and of parasitism do not exist in the
United Kingdom. Despite the obligation under article 10bis of the Paris
Convention9 and calls by many authors for a law against unfair competition,10
the United Kingdom has continually rejected the legal concept of unfair
competition as such11 as well as a general clause establishing a tort of unfair
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8 J. Schmidt-Szalewski (1994), ‘La distinction entre l’action en contrefaçon et
l’action en concurrence déloyale dans la jurisprudence’, RTD Com. 455, at 462.
9 It is arguable that the United Kingdom complies with article 10bis of the Paris
Convention because it is unclear whether article 10 bis(2) requires acts other than those
enumerated in article 10bis (3) to be considered unfair. See Robertson, Aidan and A.
Horton (1995), ‘Does the UK or the EC need an unfair competition law?’ EIPR 568, at
572.
10 W. Cornish (1972), ‘Unfair competition? A progress report’, Journal of the
Society of Public Teachers of Law, 12, 126; G. Dworkin (1979), ‘Unfair competition:
is the common law developing a new tort?’, EIPR 241; H. Brett (1979), ‘Unfair compe-
tition – not merely an academic issue?’, EIPR 295; P. Burns (1981), ‘Unfair competi-
tion – a compelling need unmet’, EIPR 311; A. Booy (1991), ‘A half-way house for
unfair competition in the United Kingdom – a practitioner’s plea’, EIPR 439;
Robertson and Horton, above fn. 9, at 581–2.
11 G. Schricker (1995), ‘25 years of protection against unfair competition’ IIC
782, at 785; Robertson and Horton above fn. 9, at 568 (during the passing of the Trade
Mark Act 1994 there was lobbying for an unfair competition law but the government
resisted it).
competition.12 As a result, there is no statute on unfair competition, neither
specific nor general.13 There is no general civil liability statutory provision as
in France,14 but courts developed a series of different unfair competition torts
to which they applied different rules, namely passing off, injurious falsehood,
defamation, interference with contractual relations, interference with trade by
unlawful means, deceit, conspiracy, intimidation and breach of confidence.15
English courts are conservative and are reluctant to create new causes of
action,16 especially a general unfair competition cause of action,17 and still
have not recognised a tort of misappropriation or parasitism.18 Therefore, in
the United Kingdom, misappropriation as such is not unlawful.19 Passing off
always requires a risk of confusion20 and the other torts are not concerned with
rendering copying per se illegal.
In conclusion, as there is no British tort of misappropriation, none of the
issues addressed in this article occurs in the United Kingdom. The same is
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12 W. Cornish (1974), ‘Unfair competition and the consumer in England’, IIC
73, at 74; Dworkin above fn. 10, at 242; F. Beier (1985), ‘The law of unfair competi-
tion in the European Community, its development and present status’, IIC 139, at 156;
Robertson and Horton, above fn. 9, at 568.
13 The only exception is misleading advertising which the United Kingdom had
to implement due to the relevant European Directives, see supra.
14 See below section 2.2.1.
15 Burns above fn. 10, p. 311; Robertson and Horton above fn. 9, p. 568.
16 Burns above fn. 10, p. 311; Cornish, William and David Llewelyn (2003),
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 5th edn,
London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 18, nn. 1–22. Courts believe this power belongs exclu-
sively to Parliament.
17 G. Dworkin (2004), ‘Unfair competition: is it time for European harmonisa-
tion?’, in D. Vaver and L. Bently (eds), Intellectual Property in the New Millennium:
Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
175, at 177.
18 An attempt to establish a general tort of unfair competition and misappropri-
ation was killed off by the Privy Council in the Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Pub
Squash Pty Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 213, commented on by G. Dworkin (1981), ‘Passing
off and unfair competition and opportunity missed’, MLR, 564, pp. 566–7. The defen-
dant had reaped where she had not sown but there was no misrepresentation. The court
stuck to the strict conditions of passing off and the claimant lost. The Privy Council
(per Lord Scarman) refused to create a tort of misappropriation because it encountered
criticism in the United States and Australia. Lord Scarman also emphasised the need to
preserve the freedom to compete: ‘A defendant, however, does no wrong by entering a
market created by another and there competing with its creator. The line may be diffi-
cult to draw; but unless it is drawn, competition will be stifled.’
19 J. Adams (1992), ‘Unfair competition: why a need is unmet’, EIPR 259, at 260.
20 Robertson and Horton, above fn. 9, at 569; Adams, above fn. 19, at 259;
Beier, above fn. 12, at 156; S. Byrt (2003), ‘Le passing-off au Royaume-Uni: des
leçons a tirer?’, 213 RIPIA 55, n. 213.
valid for Ireland, another country where parasitism is absent.21 In other words,
in those two countries, unfair competition law does not over-protect databases
which are protected by the sui generis right.
2.2. France
This section examines the legal basis of the protection against parasitism and
states under which conditions courts found copying another’s creation unlaw-
ful. It does not aim at retracing in detail the history of the notion nor of the
case law22 but only to give a picture of protection against parasitism as it
currently stands in France. This is sufficient to determine whether French law
against parasitism over-protects databases.
2.2.1. Legal basis French unfair competition law is based on the principle
of the freedom to copy. This principle dates back to the Decret d’Allarde of
2–17 March 179123 which provides for the principle of freedom of commerce
and industry. According to this principle, undertakings are free to compete and
the competitive prejudice is normally lawful. Thus, every competitor has the
right to attract the customers of her competitors. The corollary of this princi-
ple is that everyone is free to sell similar or even identical products. As far as
intellectual products are concerned, it means that everyone is free to copy or
imitate another’s creation.24 This is not illegal per se. This principle is
affirmed by courts and the vast majority of commentators.25 The principle is
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21 M. Davison (2003), The Legal Protection of Databases, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 127.
22 For more detail, see e.g. J. Passa (1997), Contrefaçon et concurrence
de´loyale, Publications de l’IRPI no. 15, Paris: Litec; M. Buydens, La protection de la
quasi-creation, Larcier: Bruxelles, 1993.
23 Also known as Loi Le Chapelier. P. De Candé (2004), ‘L’action en concur-
rence déloyale est-elle menacée par l’évolution du droit de la propriété intellectuelle?’,
Prop. Int., p. 492; Passa, above fn. 22, at 13.
24 A. Puttemans (2000), Droits intellectuels et concurrence de´loyale, Bruxelles:
Bruylant, p. 234; Buydens above fn. 22, p. 678.
25 E. Golaz (1992), L’imitation servile des produits et de leur presentation, e´tude
compare´e des droits français, allemand, belge et suisse, Ge´nève: Droz, p. 105; J.-J.
Burst (1993), Concurrence de´loyale et parasitisme, Paris: Dalloz, p. 1; Buydens, above
fn. 22, at 655, 677, 683; M. Buydens (1993), ‘La sanction de la “piraterie de produits”
par le droit de la concurrence déloyale’, Journal des Tribunaux 117, at 119, 123, fnn. 22
and 23; Passa, above fn. 22, at p. 13; M.-L. Izorche (1998), ‘Les fondements de la sanc-
tion de la concurrence de´loyale et du parasitime’, 51(1) RTD Com. 17, at 19; A. Bertrand
(1998), Le droit français de la concurrence de´loyale, Paris: Cedat, pp. 16 ff.; De Candé
(2004), at fn. 23 above, including the authors and decisions cited by all. Contra: P. Le
Tourneau (2000), ‘Retour sur le parasitisme’, Dalloz, Chronique, 403, at 405 (the simple
parasitic copy of another’s work with an interested goal is a breach).
also called the principle of pre-emption. It means that competition is free and
that limitations on competition can be set only by Parliament.26
The principle of the freedom to copy is subject to two exceptions. First, the
legislature can grant certain intellectual property rights to certain deserving
creations. In this case, copying is no longer free but is an infringement of the
right holder’s exclusive right. Second, courts declared certain types of copy-
ing contrary to honest practices in commercial matters on the basis of unfair
competition law.
French unfair competition law (concurrence deloyale) is based on civil
liability, i.e. on article 1382 of the Civil Code (‘CC’).27 The three require-
ments of any civil liability action (breach (faute28), damage and causal link)
must therefore be proven to establish that an act of unfair competition
occurred. Several acts of unfair competition are prohibited by courts on this
basis, including parasitism.
2.2.2. The concept of parasitism and conditions of application Parasitism
occurs when a third party, without incurring any expenditure, uses the fruit of
the efforts made by another by following in her wake. The copied creation
must not be banal, nor be a necessary and functional form.29 Only the copying
of ‘arbitrary’ forms is parasitic. In other words, it is the act of copying
another’s creation, even if the copy is not slavish,30 and does not create a risk
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26 A. Kamperman Sanders (1997), Unfair Competition Law: The Protection of
Intellectual and Industrial Creativity, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 11.
27 Golaz above fn. 25, at 60–1.
28 The main element of the tort is that there must be a ‘faute’. This corresponds
to the breach of the duty of care in the British tort of negligence. The term ‘breach’ will
be used to designate the faute.
29 Buydens above fn. 22, at 707, 721; Passa above fn. 22, at 272; Schmidt-
Szalewski above fn. 8, at 466–7.
30 The act of copying another’s creation is also referred to as slavish or quasi-
slavish copying. Slavish or quasi-slavish copies are simply identical or quasi-identical
copies of another person’s creation unprotected by an intellectual property right. Passa,
above fn. 22, at 242. Contra: Strowel, A. and J.-P. Triaille (1993), ‘De l’e´quilibre entre
le droit de la concurrence et la proprie´te´ intellectuelle. A propos de la proposition de
loi Godfrain sur les “cre´ations re´serve´es” ’ 2 DIT 25, at 26 (slavish copies are those
which create a risk of confusion). The notion of parasitism requires the avoidance of
efforts and does not require that the copy be slavish or quasi-slavish, although it will
generally be the case. Y. Saint-Gal (1956), ‘Concurrence parasitaire ou agissements
parasitaires’, RIPIA 37. It is not the slavish character of the copy which constitutes the
breach; the breach is the avoidance of efforts. Passa, above fn. 22, at 249 ff.; Izorche
above fn. 25 and decisions cited. However, generally, when one slavishly or quasi-slav-
ishly copies something, she inevitably always avoids effort. Slavish copying therefore
always has as a consequence that the copying product will be cheaper since the copier
of confusion, by which someone (the parasite) benefits unduly from the
creation, efforts, investment or know-how of another person without herself
making any such efforts and thereby saving the costs necessary in the creation
of the original product.31 It can now be understood why courts called the tort
‘parasitism’; the copier acts like a parasite, nourishing herself upon the efforts
of another person without making any effort herself.32 However, the Court of
Cassation has sometimes ruled that it is not necessary for the victim of para-
sitism to prove she made efforts or investments.33 The notion of parasitism
encompasses parasitic competition (concurrence parasitaire) and parasitic
acts (actes parasitaires). The difference between the two is that in the first
case, the two parties are in competition with one another and in the second,
they are not.
As parasitism is based on civil liability, to win the action, breach, damage
and causal link must be proven. However, courts interpreted those require-
ments very loosely over the years. This has had the effect that there is no need
to prove any of these three requirements to win the action.34 The breach is the
proof of parasitism. As has been seen above, in some cases it is not even
necessary to prove avoidance of efforts. Proof of copying will be sufficient.
As to damage, courts generally infer it from the breach itself. It generally
consists in the vague notion of ‘commercial turmoil’35 or can simply be a
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by definition always avoids the research and presentation costs. Parasitism and slavish
copying can therefore be said to be synonyms or quasi-synonyms. Consequently, I will
refer to parasitism only and this will encompass slavish and quasi-slavish copying.
31 E.g. Puttemans above fn. 24, at 236; Golaz above fn. 25, at 228. There are two
notions of parasitism, a broad one (parasitism exists if the copied creation necessitated
some effort or investment) and a narrow one (parasitism exists only if the copied
creation necessitated important efforts). See e.g. M. Malaurie-Vignal (1996), ‘Le para-
sitisme des investissements et du travail d’autrui’, Dalloz 177, at 180.
32 Sometimes parasitism is also referred to as ‘economic parasitism’ to distin-
guish it from parasitism occurring in nature. The term ‘parasitism’ will be used to
describe economic parasitism.
33 Contrast Cass. com., 26.01.1999 [2000] D., Jurisp. 87, cited by P. Le
Tourneau (2001), ‘Folles ide´es sur les ide´es’ CCE, Chronique no. 4, 8, at 12; Cass.
com., 30.01.2001, D., 2001, n. 24, p. 1939, Bull. Civ. IV, 27; JCP G 2001, I, 340, nn.
29 comment by Viney; D. 2001, Jurisp. 1939, comment by Le Tourneau; Prop. Int.
2002, n. 3, p. 101, comment by Passa with Cass. com., 20.05.2003, case no. 01–11212,
available on www.legifrance.gouv.fr cited by J. Passa (2003), ‘Responsabilité civile –
concurrence’ Prop. Int. 448–9 (claimants have to establish the amount of investment
necessary for a product to be copied and show to what extent litigious behaviour allows
them to benefit from it).
34 Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 64.
35 See e.g. Cass. com., 22.02.2000 [2000] CCC, com. 81, comment of Malaurie-
Vignal; Cass. com., 25.04.2001 [2001] PIBD 726, III, 451; Guerlais v Tillaud Boisouvres,
Cass. com., 01.07.2003, Juris-data no. 2003–019892, cited by J. Schmidt-Szalewski,
moral prejudice.36 It is not necessary to prove a loss of turnover or of clients,37
unless the creator seeks damages.38 In addition, it is possible to take legal
action while the damage has not yet happened (i.e. when the parasite is just
attempting to commit the act of unfair competition) to prevent it from happen-
ing.39 As far as causation is concerned, as unfair competition acts do not
always lead to a decreased turnover, courts are flexible on the certainty of the
causation and often skip the requirement altogether.40
As can now be seen, the conditions of the action against parasitism are very
lenient. Proof of copying is often sufficient to have the copying stopped.
Because in practice damage and causation need not be established, the action
is used more usually to stop the behaviour complained of41 and has come to
resemble a restrictive injunction or cease and desist order.
2.2.3. The case law How is protection against parasitism received by
French courts now? The case law of the Court of Cassation is unclear. As the
highest court’s case law does not give guidance, the whole French case law is
unsettled.
The Court of Cassation continually contradicts itself. Generally, it is clearly
in favour of the tort of parasitism.42 Thus, it is unlawful to reproduce a
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Comment, Proprie´te´ industrielle, November 2003, 29; Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 64; M.-L.
Izorche, ‘Concurrence de´loyale et parasitisme e´conomique’, in Y. Serra (2001), La
concurrence de´loyale, Permanence et devenir, Paris: Dalloz, 27, at 31–2.
36 Cass. 22.05.2002, case no. 99–21579, available on www.legifrance.gouv.fr,
cited by J. Passa (2003), ‘Responsabilité civile – concurrence’, Prop. Int. 84, at 85.
37 Cass. com., 22.10.1985, Bull. Civ. IV, no. 245. See also J. Passa,
‘Responsabilité civile – distribution’ [2002] Prop. Int. 100.
38 Cass. com., 16.01.2001 [2001] CCC, com. 59, comment of Malaurie-Vignal,
cited by J. Passa, above fn. 37, at 100.
39 See e.g. P. Le Tourneau (2001), ‘Le bon vent du parasitime’, CCC, January,
4–6, at 6.
40 J.-M. Mousseron (1992), ‘Entreprise: parasitisme et droit’, JCP E 6, 14, at
24; Burst, above fn. 25, p. 182.
41 P. Roubier (1948), ‘The´orie ge´ne´rale de l’action en concurrence de´loyale’,
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Commercial, 541, at 589; Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 63;
Burst, above fn. 25, p. 154, 174 citing CA Douai, 21.12.1989 [1990] PIBD III, 316;
Passa, above fn. 37, at 100 ff.
42 See e.g. Cass. com., 21.06.1994 [1994] PIBD, III, 514 cited by Passa, above
fn. 25, p. 273; Cass. com., 27.06.1995 [1995] RJDA, p. 1129 (parasitism does not
require proof of confusion) cited by Malaurie-Vignal, above fn. 31, at 181; Cass. com.,
26.01.1999 [2000] D., Jurisp. 87, cited by Le Tourneau, above fn. 33, at 12; Cass. com.,
30.01.2001, D., 2001, no. 24, p. 1939, comment of Le Tourneau; Bull. Civ. IV, 27; JCP
G 2001, I, 340, n. 29, comment by Viney; Prop. Int. 2002, p. 101, comment by Passa
(plagiarism of a catalogue); Cass. com., 27.03.2001 [2001] CCC, n. 123, p. 4, comment
by Malaurie; PIBD 725, III, 408; Passa, above fn. 36, pp. 100 ff.; Cass. 15.01.2002,
creation (e.g. a catalogue, a trade mark) even if this reproduction does not
entail a risk of confusion. The position of the Court recently, however, is that
there is no parasitism when the copier herself also invested herself or has made
some, even minor, differences to her product even if she copied to avoid
effort.43 On the other hand, in other decisions from the late 1990s to date, the
Court did not accept that parasitism alone is an act of unfair competition;
instead it required a risk of confusion.44 And in two decisions of 2002, the
Court held that it is not unlawful to sell products identical to those of another
undertaking which are unprotected by an intellectual property right.45 These
decisions are difficult to reconcile with other decisions of the Court of the
same period (2001–2003) which clearly favour the prevention of parasitism.46
While the most recent decisions show that the Court seemingly prefers to keep
the tort of parasitism alive, the current situation is unsettled as the Court has
continually oscillated between the two positions over the last few years.
The vast majority of the decisions of the Courts of Appeal and of First
Instance also favour of the tort of parasitism.47 However, they remain split.
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22.05.2002, 18.06.2002 and 08.10.2002, cited by J. Passa (2003), ‘Responsabilité
civile – concurrence’, Prop. Int. 84, at 85; Cass. 08.07.2003, case no. 01-13293 cited
by Passa, above fn. 32, at 448–9; Cass. com., 29.10.2003 [2004] PIBD 778, III, 47,
cited by J. Passa (2004), ‘Responsabilité civile – concurrence’, Prop. Int. pp. 683 ff.;
Cass. 01.07.03, case no. 01-00628, available on www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
43 Cass. com., 18.06.2002 [2003] PIBD 755, III, 22 cited by J. Passa (2003),
‘Responsabilité civile – concurrence’, Prop. Int. 84, at 85; Cass. com., 17.12.2002
[2003] PIBD 764, III, 278, cited by J. Passa, above fn. 32, at 448–9. Thus the Court of
Cassation limits the hypotheses of parasitism to pure slavish imitations. That was not
the position of the previous case law. Ibid.
44 Cass. com., 21.10.1997 [1998] PIBD 645, III, 21; Cass. com., 27.01.1998
[1998] PIBD 657, III, 362; Cass. com., 05.10.1999 [2000] PIBD 691, III, 75 cited by
J. Passa (2000), ‘Propos dissidents sur la sanction du parasitisme e´conomique’, Dalloz
Cah. Dr. Aff., Chronique, no. 25, 297, at 306; Cass. com., 16.01.2001 [2001] Bull. Civ,
IV, no. 13; CCC, Comm. 43, comment by Malaurie-Vignal; JCP IV 1421; Cass. com.,
13.02.2001 [2001] PIBD 723, III, 354. See also Passa, above fn. 36, pp. 100ff.
45 Cass. com., 18.06.2002 [2002] PIBD 754, III, 578, cited by Passa, above fn.
42, p. 684; Distribution Casino France v Ratureau, Cass. com., 09.07.2002 [2003]
CCC, Jan. 2003, p. 11; Prop. Int. p. 82, comment by Passa.
46 Above fn. 42–3.
47 Golaz, above fn. 25, at 106; Passa, above fn. 22, at 267 ff.; Bertrand, above
fn. 25, at 47 fn. 122 and 123; p. 48 fn. 124, and decisions cited. As far as databases are
concerned, parasitism was found in two recent cases. Edirom v Global Market
Network, T. Comm. Nanterre, 27.01.1998 [1999] DIT, 99/3, p. 42; [1998] Expertises,
p. 149, comment by Ragueneau (act of posting paper database on the internet,
performed before the entry into force of the Directive, is parasitic); Tigest v Reed
Exposition France et Salons Français et internationaux, CA Paris, 12.09.2001, [2001]
Legipresse, no. 187, Dec., pp. 215–25; [2001] D., no. 35, p. 2895; [2002] JCP, no. 1,
pp. 25–31, comment by Pollaud-Dulian; [2002] PIBD 740, III, 198–201; [2002] RIDA,
For instance, a section of the Paris Court of Appeal48 as well as the Versailles
Court of Appeal49 firmly rejects the tort of parasitism and requires that a risk
of confusion be present for an act of copying to be unlawful.
In conclusion, the situation in France is unclear. The Court of Cassation’s
most recent decisions condemn parasitism but in view of its other recent
conflicting decisions, the status of the tort of parasitism is uncertain.
Additionally, although the majority of the lower courts are in favour of
preventing parasitism, they remain split. As France has a long tradition in
favour of the prevention of parasitism, it is very likely that the tort is still alive.
2.3. Belgium
As for France, this section examines the legal basis of the tort of parasitism
and its conditions in Belgium. It does not aim to retrace in detail the history of
the notion nor of the case law50 but only to give a picture of protection against
parasitism as it currently stands in Belgium.
2.3.1. Legal basis Belgian unfair competition law is also based on the prin-
ciple of the freedom to copy. This principle is also based on the French Decret
d’Allarde, which is still applicable in Belgium51 and is indirectly consecrated
in article 96 of the Lois sur les Pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et
la protection du consommateur (‘LPCC’).52 This means that everyone is free
to copy or imitate another’s creation.53 This principle of the freedom to copy
is firmly affirmed by Belgian courts and literature.54
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no. 192, p. 433 affirming TGI Paris 22.06.1999 [1999] PIBD 686, III, 494; cited by J.
Passa (2002), ‘Responsabilité civile – concurrence’, Prop. Int. 103, at 106 (acts of
copying and marketing a paper database, performed before the entry into force of the
Directive, are parasitic). Very few lower courts have rejected the tort of parasitism. See
Passa, above fn. 22, pp. 58–9, 286, who identified only a couple of decisions.
48 Passa, above fn. 44, at 306; Passa, above fn. 37, at 112–13; Passa, above fn.
33, at 448–9.
49 Passa, above fn. 47, at 103; De Candé, above fn. 25, at 495, and decisions
cited.
50 For more detail, see e.g. Buydens, above fn. 22; Puttemans, above fn. 24.
51 Strowel and Triaille, above fn. 30, p. 26.
52 M.B. 29.08.1991; in force 29.02.1992 (Act on commercial practices and on
information and the protection of the consumer). Buydens above fn. 22, p. 678.
53 Puttemans above fn. 24, at 234; Buydens, above fn. 22, at 678; Buydens,
above fn. 25, at 188.
54 See for instance, Cass. 04.11.1954, Ing.-Cons., 1954.249; Prés. Trib. Com.
Brussels, 03.06.1970, JCB 1971, III, 413, note De Gryse; Trib. Com. Courtrai
30.03.1987, Pratiques Commerciales, 1987.I.291; CA Antwerp, 30.05.1988, Rev. Dr.
Com. Belge, 1988.949; CA Brussels, 24.08.1995, unreported, cited by Van Bunnen,
Journal des Tribunaux, 1997, p. 62; Prés. Trib. Com. Namur, 22.05.1996, Journal des
As in France, this principle suffers two exceptions. First, the legislator
grants certain intellectual property rights to certain deserving creations. In this
case, copying is no longer free but an infringement of the right holder’s exclu-
sive right. Second, courts have declared certain types of copying contrary to
honest practices in commercial matters on the basis of unfair competition law.
Like French unfair competition law, that of Belgium was initially based on
article 1382 of the Civil Code (‘CC’).55 However, the civil liability action
soon proved unsuitable because it is slow and expensive, damage must be
proved and stopping the behaviour preventively is not possible.56 Therefore,
in 1934, specific legislation was enacted to enable the injured competitor to
get a restrictive injunction or cease and desist order (action en cessation).57
The difference between the two actions is that the civil liability action requires
proof of damage and cannot be used to put an end to the behaviour complained
of while the action en cessation does not require proof of actual damage and
allows the claimant to put an end to the behaviour. The 1934 legislation was
replaced by an act of 1971 on trade practices.58 This act abandoned the
requirement of a competitive relationship between parties to a suit and also
protected consumers’ interests.59 The act of 1971 was replaced by the current
LPCC, which retains the same principles as the 1971 act. The central provi-
sion of the LPCC is article 93 which provides that ‘[a]ny act contrary to honest
practices in commercial matters by which a trader prejudices or can prejudice
the professional interests of one or several traders is forbidden’. There is no
further definition so the number of acts which can be considered contrary to
honest practices in commercial matters is potentially infinite and is determined
by courts. Finally, the action en cessation has not replaced the civil liability
action, so it remains possible to act under traditional civil liability.60
2.3.2. Case law Parasitism was rarely considered unlawful until a decision
of 1936.61 In that case, the court condemned the defendant for slavish copying
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Tribunaux, 1997, p. 62, obs. L. Van Bunnen; CA Lie`ge, 13.10.1998, Rev. Dr. Com.
Belge, 1998/6, p. 410. Buydens, above fn. 25, at 119 and fn. 20 for further decisions
and commentators; F. De Visscher (2003), ‘L’action en concurrence de´loyale comme
moyen de protection en Belgique’, RIPIA, no. 213, p. 51, at 52–3; Golaz, above fn. 25,
p. 117; Passa, above fn. 44.
55 Golaz, above fn. 25, at p. 68.
56 Buydens, above fn. 22, at p. 656; Golaz, above fn. 25, at p. 68.
57 Royal Decree no. 55 of 23 December 1934.
58 Loi sur les pratiques du commerce of 14 July 1971, M.B. 30.07.1971, p. 9087.
59 E. Ulmer (1973), ‘Unfair competition law in the European Economic
Community’, IIC 188; Beier, above fn. 12, at p. 154.
60 Golaz, above fn. 25, at p. 68; Buydens, above fn. 22, at pp. 656–7.
61 Buydens, above fn. 22, at p. 710.
because it allowed her to sell her product at a cheaper price.62 Other decisions
followed that trend63 until the highest court endorsed it in 1954.64 The first
decision to mention expressly the terms ‘parasitic competition’ and to apply the
theory dates from 1959.65 In the 1960s and 1970s, the reference to parasitic
competition grew66 and in the 1980s, parasitism was systematically used by
competitors whose creations had been copied and was widely accepted by the
courts.67 So in Belgium until recently, decisions against the tort of parasitism
were rare.68 The most recent decisions apply neither the narrow nor the broad
conception of parasitism but reject the tort in its entirety, thus making one
believe that the tort of parasitism has actually died. It seems to be largely admit-
ted now that a copy can only be prohibited if it creates a risk of confusion in
the mind of the public.69 Two recent cases which follow this trend actually
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62 See Pres. Trib. Com. Brussels, 24.07.1936, Ing.-Cons., 1937, p. 18. See
Buydens, above fn. 22, at p. 710; Buydens, above fn. 25, at p. 122; Passa, above fn. 22,
at p. 266.
63 Trib. Com. Brussels, 03.06.1937, Ing.-Cons., 1937, p. 85; Trib. Civ.
Charleroi, 24.06.1939, Ing.-Cons., 1939, p. 125, cited by Passa, above fn. 22, at p. 266
and Buydens, above fn. 25, at p. 122.
64 Cass. 04.11.1954, Ing.-Cons., 1954, 249.
65 Trib. Com. Brussels, 14.02.1959, Ing.-Cons., 1965, 258, comment by De
Caluwe. See Buydens, above fn. 22, at p. 710; Buydens, above fn. 25, at p. 123; Golaz,
above fn. 25, at p. 226; Y. Saint-Gal (1981), ‘Concurrence et agissements parasitaires
en droit français et belge’, in La concurrence parasitaire en droit compare´, Actes du
Colloque de Lausanne, Genève: Droz, 1981, 133, at 141.
66 Golaz, above fn. 25, at p. 228. See e.g. Prés. Trib. Com. Courtrai, 13.06.1974,
JCB 1975.III.194, comment by De Caluwé; Prés. Trib. Com. Malines, 15.09.1977, JCB
1980.III.39, comment by De Caluwé and J. Billiet; Ghent, 20.01.1978, JCB
1978.III.573; Trib.Com. Brussels, 29.10.1979, Ing.-Cons., 1980, p. 31.
67 See CA Antwerp, 30.05.1988, Rev. Dr. Com., 1988, p. 949; CA Brussels,
14.03.1989, Ing.-Cons., 1989, p. 115; Trib. Com. Brussels, 09.06.1989, Rev. Dr. Com.,
1991, p. 331; Trib. Com. Verviers, 10.10.1989, Ing.-Cons., 1990, p. 178; Trib. Com.
Namur, 29.11.1990, Ing.-Cons., 1991, p. 172, all cited by Passa, above fn. 22, at p. 273.
See also Buydens, above fn. 22, at p. 712; Buydens, above fn 25, at p. 123, citing a
number of decisions, fn. 76.
68 See e.g. Prés. Trib. Com. Brussels, 17.12.1969, Ing.-Cons., 1972, p. 82 (not
unfair to use brochures whose form is identical to those of the claimant when this form
is not original and is used by competitors), cited by Saint-Gal, above fn. 64; Prés. Com.
Brussels, 07.11.1974, JCB 1975, 385 (the copying of commercial and technical docu-
mentation consisting of banal representations and resulting from no creative expensive
effort was not judged an act of parasitic competition); Trib. Com. Brussels, 05.05.1980,
Ing.-Cons., 1980, p. 356.
69 Passa, above fn. 44, at pp. 304 and 306, citing Trib. Com. Namur, 22.05.1996,
Journal des Tribunaux, 1997, p. 62; Trib. Com. Antwerp, 09.10.1997, AJT, 1997–8, p.
581; CA Liège, 17.02.1998, Rev. Dr. Com. Belge, 1998/6, p. 415, comment by Putzeys;
CA Liège, 13.10.1998, Rev. Dr. Com. Belge, 1998/6, p. 410.
relate to parasitic acts concerning databases. They were decided before the
entry into force of the Directive. In the first one,70 the court held that Kapitol
Trading, which had copied in their entirety the files (numbers, names and
addresses of subscribers) of the Belgian first telecommunications operator,
Belgacom, did not benefit from the name, creative work or investments of
Belgacom. Hence, Belgacom did not win on parasitic competition. In the
second case,71 the defendant had copied the claimant’s address file. The judge
held that the file was not protected by copyright and it would be against the
freedom of commerce to recognise a special protection for it. In sum, the case
law prior to the Directive applied the freedom to copy strictly; the LPCC
cannot grant the database producer an exclusive right which is not organised
by a specific statute.72 There have been no further cases confirming this trend.
In conclusion, the situation as regards parasitism in Belgium is uncertain. It
is not clear whether the theory of parasitism survives and if so what its condi-
tions are.73 Whereas the recent decisions seem to show that parasitism is dead,
there are no Court of Cassation decisions to confirm this.
3. Simultaneous protection
After this general overview of the status of the French and Belgian tort of para-
sitism, this section examines whether the protection of the sui generis right
and parasitism for databases can be cumulated, in other words whether an
infringement action can be combined with an unfair competition action for
parasitism. If this is the case, the section will determine whether this simulta-
neous protection over-protects databases. Thereafter, the question whether the
sui generis right holder has a choice between the infringement and unfair
competition actions will be examined.
3.1. Is simultaneous protection possible?
3.1.1. France As the unfair competition and infringement actions are
distinct and have a different cause and object, they can be cumulated.74 This
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70 Belgacom v Kapitol Trading, Prés. Com. Brussels., 19.07.1995, Ann. Prat.
Comm. 1995, p. 788, comment Byl; R.D.C., 1996, p. 747. See also Puttemans, above
fn. 24 at p. 442; Strowel, Alain and Estelle Derclaye (2001), Droit d’auteur et
nume´rique: logiciels, bases de données et multimedia, droit belge, europe´en et
compare´, Bruxelles: Bruylant, p. 340, n. 388.
71 See Prés. Trib. Com. Courtrai, 06.09.1996, R.D.C., 1997, p. 47, comment by
De Vuyst and p. 442, Puttemans, above fn. 24.
72 Puttemans, above fn. 24, at p. 442.
73 The legislator also believes that the theory of parasitism is unclear. See
Puttemans, above fn. 24, at p. 445, fn. 2009, citing Expose´ des Motifs, Doc. Parl., Ch.,
1997–8, no. 1535/1–1536/1, p. 6.
74 Passa, above fn. 22, p. 73; Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 84.
possibility to cumulate is expressly provided for in articles L. 615–19 al. 2 and
L. 716–3 of the Intellectual Property Code (‘IPC’) which state that actions in
infringement of patents or trade marks which also raise an unfair competition
question are brought exclusively before the Court of First Instance (tribunal
de grande instance).75 As far as databases are concerned, article L. 341–1 ff.
of the IPC provides a civil liability action. Article L. 341–1 paragraph 2 of the
IPC states that sui generis protection is without prejudice to copyright or other
protections on the database.
The two actions are subject to the fulfilment of their respective conditions.76
The unfair competition action thus complements the infringement action.77
This complementary nature means that there can be cumulation as long as the
acts of unfair competition complained of are distinct from the infringement
acts. Therefore, there can only be a condemnation for unfair competition if a
breach distinct from infringement can be established. If there is not, the unfair
competition action is rejected. Courts and commentators are anonymous on this
point.78 The existence of a distinct breach can be explained by the fact that the
damages for infringement must be granted on the principle of integral repara-
tion of the prejudice. The same act cannot serve as the basis of an unfair compe-
tition action because there would be no prejudice to repair.79 The claimant
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75 Passa, above fn. 22, p. 73.
76 Ibid.
77 Roubier, above fn. 41, at p. 555; Passa, above fn. 22. pp. 2, 73; Bertrand 1998,
op cit. fn. 25, p. 25. However, the Court of Cassation has affirmed (Cass com.,
22.09.1983 [1984] D., 187) that the action in unfair competition requires a breach while
the action in infringement sanctions the infringement of a privative right. The two
actions have different causes and different aims; one does not complement the other.
See also Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 84 (the action in unfair competition is independent of
the infringement action; it is not the accessory, the complement or the consequence of
the infringement action. However courts cumulate the actions as long as there are facts
distinct from infringement).
78 See e.g. Cass. com., 23.05.1973, Bull. Civ. IV, no. 182; Villeroy & Bosch, CA
Paris, 16.11.2001, Juris-data, no. 2001–170988. Roubier, above fn. 41, at p. 557; Burst,
above fn. 25, at pp. 2, 146; Bertrand, above fn. 25, at pp. 153–4; Passa, above fn. 22,
at p. 2; Golaz, above fn. 21, at pp. 84–5; X. Desjeux, ‘La reproduction ou copie servile
et l’action en concurrence de´loyale dans la jurisprudence française’ [1976] JCP, ed.
CIJ, no. 17, at 240; P. Le Tourneau (1993), ‘Le parasitisme dans tous ses e´tats’, Dalloz,
42e Cahier, Chronique, 310, at 311 citing Mousseron, Jean-Marc (1990),
‘Responsabilite´ civile et droits intellectuels’, in Me´langes Chavanne, Paris: Litec,
1990, 247; Izorche, above fn. 35, at p. 33; R. Clauss (1995), ‘The French law of
disloyal competition’, EIPR 550, at 552–3; Schmidt-Szalewski, above fn. 8, p. 456;
Malaurie-Vignal, above fn. 31, at p. 178; De Candé, above fn. 25, at p. 493.
Specifically as regards the sui generis right, see N. Mallet-Poujol (2003), ‘Protection
des bases de donne´es’, ed. Juris-classeur, n. 9, fasc. 6080.
79 Passa, above fn. 22, at p. 73.
cannot ask for a single global reparation since the two damages are different
but she must ask for the reparation of two distinct damages.80 In spite of this
rule, many judges often grant a global sum.81
Commentators disagree as to what constitute acts distinct from infringe-
ment. For some, parasitism is not a distinct act. Only acts without any link to
the creation (or sign) infringed, such as disparagement, misleading advertis-
ing, copying secret know-how or risk of confusion, can constitute distinct
acts.82 For others, parasitism can be a distinct act.83
The case law fluctuated on this point and is still unsettled. In many cases
involving infringement of subject-matter protected by patent, trade mark and
copyright, the Court of Cassation and some courts of appeal held that (slavish)
copying, because it allows the copier to save costs and market the product at
a reduced price, is an act distinct from infringement.84 The Court of Cassation
confirmed this view in recent decisions.85 On the other hand, the Paris Court
of Appeal made it very clear in a number of decisions that it is not possible to
condemn for both infringement and parasitism.86
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82 Ibid.; Bertrand, above fn. 25, at p. 154; P.-Y. Gautier (2001), Proprie´te´
litte´raire et artistique, 4th edn., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, p. 186, n. 114;
Mallet-Poujol, above fn. 77.
83 X. Desjeux (1992), ‘La reprise de la prestation d’autrui: l’ide´e commerciale et
l’investissement économique (esquisse d’un projet de loi)’, Gaz. Pal., Doctr. 973, at
976.
84 E.g. Cass. com, 30.11.1966, Bull., no. 460, Bull. civ., III, 407; Cass.
02.01.1969 [1969] RIPIA 13, cited by Desjeux above fn. 77, at p. 240; Cass. com,
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583; CA Versailles, 05.04.2001 [2002] PIBD 734, III, 38 cited by J. Passa (2002),
‘Responsabilite´ civile – distribution’, Prop. Int. 81. For more decisions, see Passa,
above fn. 22, at pp. 249, 274–5; ibid., (2002), ‘Responsabilite´ civile – distribution’,
Prop. Int. 81; Golaz, above fn. 25, p. 106 fn. 268–72; p. 241, fn. 872.
85 Comite´ national olympique et sportif français v Groupement d’achat des
centres Leclerc, Cass. com., 11.03.2003 [2003] CCC, August–Sept. 2003, p. 24 (imita-
tion of a trade mark is a fact distinct from trade mark infringement); Cass. 08.07.2003
[2003] PIBD 773, III, 519, cited by De Candé, above fn. 25, at p. 496.
86 CA Paris, 31.10.1991 [1992] Ann. Prop. Ind., p. 213; CA Paris, 05.11.1992
[1993] RDPI, no. 47, p. 50; CA Paris, 20.09.1995 [1996] Gaz. Pal., 1, somm. 166; CA
Paris, 20.03.1996 [1996] PIBD III, 419; [1996] RDPI, no. 65, p. 62; CA Paris,
22.05.1996 [1996] Gaz. Pal., 2 somm. 508; CA Paris, 03.07.1996 [1996] Gaz. Pal., 2
somm. 504; CA Paris, 12.12.2001 [2002] PIBD, 740, III, 196, cited by Passa, above fn.
83.
How have courts applied these principles to databases? Courts are split on
the issue of whether parasitism is an act distinct from sui generis right
infringement.
The great majority of courts ruled that copying a protected database is not
an act distinct from sui generis right infringement. In France Telecom v MA
Editions,87 MA Editions had copied France Telecom’s phonebook. The court
ruled that the database was protected and the extractions were illegal and
condemned on the basis of infringement of the sui generis right. The court
rejected France Telecom’s argument based on enrichment without cause
because the acts were illegal on the basis of the law implementing the
Directive in France.
In Groupe Miller Freeman v Tigest Communication,88 Tigest was held to
infringe because it had extracted all the information contained in Groupe
Miller Freeman’s (‘GMF’) sui generis right-protected catalogue for commer-
cial purposes. The court held therefore that there could be no additional
condemnation on the basis of parasitism since the acts of copying were not
distinct from the infringement acts.89 The same conclusion was drawn by the
Court of First Instance of Paris in another case involving GMF against another
defendant.90 In this case, the court rejected the action based on parasitism
because the parasitic acts were a direct consequence of illegal extraction of the
contents of a database and could not be distinguished from them. In a decision
of March 2002,91 the Paris Court of Appeal held the sui generis right infringed
but rejected the action for parasitism. It held that the defendant’s attempt to
benefit from the investments made by the claimant was not distinct from the
unlawful extraction under the sui generis right.
In Cadremploi v Keljob,92 Keljob extracted and re-utilised daily a qualita-
tively substantial part of Cadremploi’s database of job advertisements without
the latter’s authorisation and was held to infringe Cadremploi’s sui generis
right. Keljob’s acts did not create a risk of confusion between Cadremploi’s
and Keljob’s web sites because the internet user was warned that she was 
leaving Keljob’s web site and transferred to Cadremploi’s site. Since
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sitism for databases. See below, this section.
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91 Construct Data Verlag v Reed Expositions France, CA Paris, 20.03.2002
[2002] PIBD, 746, III, 331–4.
92 TGI Paris, 05.09.2001 [2001] Legipresse, no. 187, Dec., pp. 219–21,
comment by Tellier-Loniewski.
customers’ diversion was a consequence of the extraction, it was not an act
distinct from sui generis right infringement and the unfair competition action
was dismissed.
In Tigest v Reed Exposition France et Salons Français et internationaux,93
the defendant copied the claimant’s paper catalogue. This took place before and
after the entry into force of the Directive. For the acts committed after the entry
into force, the court condemned for infringement of the sui generis right and
rejected parasitism as not distinct from infringement. In Editions Neressis v
France Telecom Multimedia Services,94 Neressis’s sui generis right in its data-
base of advertisements was infringed by the defendant. Neressis’s argument that
the extraction and commercial use of its database was an act of unfair competi-
tion as the defendant had appropriated its investments without paying was
rejected as these acts were not distinct from infringement of the sui generis right.
So far, three courts have found that parasitism is an act distinct from sui
generis right infringement, albeit in indirect ways. In a decision of 2003,95
EIP’s reproduction of Jataka’s database, a CD-ROM containing a list of
French municipalities, was held to infringe Jataka’s sui generis right. In addi-
tion, EIP was condemned for unfair competition because it had disseminated
the contents of the database and usurped Jataka’s clients. But usurping clients
by distributing a copy of a protected database is parasitism. In OCP
Repartition v Salvea,96 OCP created a database listing the names of hundreds
of thousands of pharmaceutical products and their descriptions. OCP sold this
database on CD-ROM and made it available on the internet on subscription.
Salvea reproduced notices coming from OCP’s database on its internet site.
The court held that OCP’s database was protected by the sui generis right.
Salvea’s copy was slavish and the court found Salvea liable for sui generis
right infringement. The court however also found Salvea liable for acts of
unfair competition, i.e. that Salvea benefited from OCP’s investments. Salvea
was ordered to pay under the two causes of action albeit the damage was the
same under both heads (to benefit from OCP’s investments by copying its
database merges with sui generis right infringement). As a result, the claimant
was compensated twice for the same damage. Finally, in Consultant
Immobilier v Aptitudes Immobilier,97 the court held that the defendant had
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94 TGI Paris, 14.11.2001, available on www.legalis.net.
95 Jataka v EIP, TGI Strasbourg, 22.07.2003, available on www.legalis.net.
96 Trib. Com. Paris, 19.03.2004, available on www.legalis.net.
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infringed the claimant’s sui generis right in its clients list. Additionally, the
court found the defendant liable for unfair competition because it appropriated
the claimant’s files which were an element of the claimant’s business. Again
this act merges with the infringement of the claimant’s sui generis right.
As there has been no Court of Cassation decision on the specific issue of
simultaneous protection of databases and the lower courts are split, the issue
is unresolved. A majority of the few commentators who have written on the
possibility of cumulating an action in unfair competition for parasitism and an
action in infringement of the sui generis right think that, as the sui generis
right codified parasitism in respect of databases, cumulation is not possible.98
In the same vein, the commentators have held that enrichment without cause
is now encompassed by the sui generis right.99
In conclusion, although the majority of courts do not allow the cumulation
of the unfair competition action for parasitism and the action in sui generis
right infringement, a few courts do. This creates simultaneous over-protection.
3.1.2. Belgium The LPCC prohibits the cumulation of the action for
infringement of an intellectual property right and the action en cessation for
unfair competition.100 The prohibition is found in article 96 LPCC, which
states: ‘Article 95 does not apply to infringement acts which are prohibited by
the statutes on patents, trade marks, designs and models, and copyright and
neighbouring rights’. Article 95 LPCC provides that: ‘The president of the
commercial court declares the existence and orders the cessation of an act . . .
which constitutes an infringement to the provisions of this statute . . . .’
Article 96 LPCC therefore prevents the holder of an intellectual property
right from acting under both actions before the president of the commercial
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98 P. Gaudrat (1999), ‘Loi de transposition de la directive 96/9 du 11 mars 1996
sur les bases de donne´es: le champ de la protection par le droit sui generis’ 52 (1) RTD
com. 86, at 89; Passa, above fn. 22, at p. 294; Mallet-Poujol, above fn. 77, n. 147;
Gautier, above fn. 81, n. 114 (if the database producer does not win on the basis of the
sui generis right because there is no infringement, she should not win on the basis of
the parasitism theory either because no breach is identifiable). See also J. Passa (2002),
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99 A. Brüning, comment on France Telecom v MA Editions, T. com. Paris,
18.06.1999 [1999] Expertises 308.
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236.
court (tribunal de commerce).101 Article 96 LPCC does not expressly mention
the sui generis right. However, it can reasonably be assumed that the sui
generis right is included in the prohibition because it is a neighbouring right.
Indeed, the Civil Procedure Code has assimilated the sui generis right to a
neighbouring right.102 In addition to article 96 LPCC, article 12.A of the Trade
Mark Act as well as article 14.5 (now 14.8) of the Designs Act provide for the
same prohibition, i.e. it is not possible to act on the basis of unfair competition
for acts which are only an infringement.103 A similar prohibition does not exist
in the copyright and patent acts. Despite the silence of the two acts, it has been
argued that this approach can be extrapolated to other intellectual property
rights.104 Some courts seem to conform to the prohibition of cumulation,105
but other courts still circumvent it.106
How does the prohibition of article 96 LPCC work in practice? Article 96
LPCC is interpreted strictly both by courts and commentators.107 This strict inter-
pretation leads to an exception to the rule of non-cumulation. The justification for
this exception is based on the different aims of the two actions: the infringement
action only protects the creator while the unfair competition action aims to protect
the undertaking of the trader against unfair acts of other traders.108 Thus, while
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it is not possible to cumulate both actions if they tend to prohibit the same act
(e.g. the infringement of an intellectual property right), it is possible to act
under both actions if the acts of unfair competition complained of are based on
acts distinct from infringement acts.109 In the 1939 Court of Cassation case
where the rule is rooted, it was held that the prohibition of the cumulation of
actions did not prevent the holder of a trade mark from acting in unfair compe-
tition for the dishonest acts which can accompany infringement.110 Article 13,
paragraph 1, indent 2 of the act implementing the Software Directive in Belgian
law111 also provides that any claim which is based at the same time on an
infringement act and an unfair competition act must be introduced exclusively
before the first instance court.112 This proves that it is possible to act under both
statutes. The accompanying act must be distinct from the infringement act.113
The case law and literature have upheld this principle.114 In conclusion, if the
act is distinct from the infringement act, it is possible to introduce the action en
cessation before the President of the commercial court.115
The question is therefore, as in France, what an act distinct from infringe-
ment is. Commentators disagree on this. Some think that both a risk of confu-
sion and the narrow conception of parasitism (i.e. the systematic and
characterised looting by the copier of the efforts of the copied) constitute acts
contrary to honest practices, detachable from the infringement of the intellec-
tual property right.116 But they then add that if the risk of confusion or para-
sitic behaviour merges with infringement, the claimant cannot win on the basis
of unfair competition.117 Others believe that parasitism cannot succeed where
there is a statute granting specific protection to the innovator.118 As, in our
view, the sui generis right is a codification of parasitism by a special statute,
a parasitic act always merges with an act infringing the sui generis right. In
conclusion, parasitism, be it in its broad or narrow sense, cannot be an act
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113 Ibid., at p. 255; Buydens, above fn. 22, at pp. 716 ff.
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distinct from infringement. Only the risk of confusion, disparagement,
misleading advertising and other acts contrary to honest practices can consti-
tute distinct acts.
Very few decisions if any in the field of copyright have distinguished the
infringement act from the act of unfair competition. The main reason is, as we
shall see below, that many infringements acts have been condemned under the
unfair competition action because the claimant can, in its summons, omit the
term ‘infringement’ and only mention unfair competition.119
How do these principles apply to databases? In relation to databases,
Puttemans has claimed that it is clear from the travaux préparatoires of the act
implementing the Database Directive in Belgian law that it is not possible to
protect databases which fulfil the requirements of the Directive by the theory
of parasitism.120 However, it is not as clear from the travaux préparatoires as
Puttemans would like to make us believe. The travaux préparatoires simply
state that the creation of a new sui generis right was envisaged instead of
harmonising unfair competition laws to protect database contents. They are
silent as to whether sui generis right-protected databases can also be protected
by parasitism. In our view, as in France, databases can only be protected addi-
tionally against unfair competition if a distinct act (e.g. misleading advertis-
ing, disparagement of the database producer) occurs. However, in view of the
muddled state of the case law, courts may allow the two counts to succeed
even if the act is in fact not distinct from infringement.
3.2. Does the sui generis right holder have a choice between the
infringement and unfair competition actions?
3.2.1. France An important question is whether the holder of the sui
generis right has a choice between infringement and unfair competition
actions. Indeed, having a choice can lead to over-protection because the condi-
tions for an unfair competition action for parasitism are less stringent than
those for a sui generis right. Normally, the principle of pre-emption should
apply and there should be no choice. If there is an infringement of the sui
generis right, the holder must act on that basis. Let us see how the lawmaker
and the courts have tackled this issue.
Article 12.2 of the Civil Procedure Code obliges the judge to re-categorise
an unfair competition action into an action for infringement of an intellectual
property right if an unfair competition action is alleged instead of an infringe-
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ment action.121 Thus, the intellectual property right holder victim of an
infringement cannot choose one or the other action. She must proceed under
an infringement action.
The majority of commentators believe that an unfair competition action is
not or should not be a substitute for an infringement action.122 In other words,
the intellectual property right holder should not be allowed to choose between
infringement and unfair competition actions. She must act on infringement. A
1978 decision of the Court of Cassation is often cited to support this argu-
ment.123 The Court held that the aim of an unfair competition action is to
ensure protection of the person who cannot avail herself of any privative right.
Commentators believe that this means that a contrario an intellectual property
right holder cannot use an unfair competition action (for parasitism in the case
of databases).124 If infringement is alleged but is not found and the claimant
does not allege a distinct act of unfair competition, the unfair competition
action is rejected.125 However, a minority of commentators believe that the
database producer can choose between acting on the basis of infringement of
the sui generis right or on unfair competition because the Directive does not
seem to exclude it.126
Despite article 12.2 of the Civil Procedure Code forbidding choice, a
number of courts allowed the unfair competition action for parasitism rather
than the infringement action not only when there was infringement of the
sui generis right but also of other intellectual property rights and also when
the infringement was not established.127 The Court of Cassation recently
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validated this choice between the two actions. In 2001, it held that the plagia-
rism of a catalogue which imitates both substance and form is parasitic.128
There can be plagiarism when there is no confusion and parasitism can
subsist even if the parasitic acts do not concern elements which cost efforts
and investments to the maker of the catalogue. No mention was made of the
sui generis right.
As far as databases are concerned, it is not clear from the case law whether
courts allow the option between the infringement and unfair competition
actions. It is mainly in early decisions that courts do not refer to the sui
generis right but only to parasitism. This is perhaps due to the claimants’
ignorance of the new sui generis right or perhaps because the acts were
committed before the entry into force of the Directive. In a decision of 1998,
the reproduction of a database of customs tariffs was held to be parasitic.129
No reference was made to the sui generis right. In Le Serveur Administratif v
Editions Législatives,130 Les Editions Legislatives’ dictionary including 400
collective conventions was reproduced almost identically by Le Serveur
Administratif. The court found the dictionary protected by copyright since its
arrangement of the conventions was original. It held that in addition to
infringing the copyright in the database, the defendant committed parasitic
acts and created a risk of confusion in the public’s mind due to similarities
between claimant’s and defendant’s works. Surprisingly, the sui generis right
was not discussed.131
In Cadremploi v Keljob,132 the Court of First Instance of Paris held that
Keljob’s use of Cadremploi’s database elements – and thereby the investments
made by Cadremploi – without paying was parasitic. It thus enjoined Keljob
from using Cadremploi’s database of job advertisements. Although the court
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mentioned earlier that Cadremploi was justified in invoking sui generis right
protection, it did not rule on that basis.133 In a decision of the Court of Appeal
of Aix-en-Provence,134 parts of the claimant’s web site (sections of a statute)
were copied by the defendant. Nowhere did the court refer to the web site as
a database, but it could well have been classified and protected as such. The
problem was surely that the part extracted and re-utilised was not substantial.
The claimant based its action solely on tort and not on infringement of the sui
generis right and the court held the defendant liable only for parasitism.
Nonetheless, in a decision of 2002,135 the sui generis right was not infringed
because a substantial part had not been taken and the court rejected the unfair
competition action since there were no distinct acts. This latter case means that
it is not possible to act on parasitism when the conditions of the intellectual
property right are fulfilled but the latter is not infringed. The option between
the two actions is not allowed.
In conclusion, although statutory law makes clear that there can be no
choice between the unfair competition action for parasitism and the action for
infringement of the sui generis right, many courts allowed this option. This
creates over-protection because the intellectual property right holder can
bypass the stricter conditions of the intellectual property right by acting in
unfair competition instead.
3.2.2. Belgium It has been argued that the action en cessation should not
be used as a substitute for the infringement action.136 In other words, if the
claimant has an intellectual property right, she does not have a choice between
the action en cessation and the infringement action; she must act for infringe-
ment of her intellectual property right only. This is in accordance with the
principle of the primacy of intellectual property rights.137 However, some
claimants used the action en cessation rather than the infringement action and
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succeeded in some cases.138 In fact, Belgian procedural law allows it. If the
summons is drafted to only cover infringing acts, the president of the commer-
cial court is incompetent. But if the claimant drafts it to cover the same acts
but describes them as unfair competition acts and does not use the term
‘infringement’, then the president of the commercial court is competent.139
Again, this creates over-protection because the intellectual property right
holder can bypass the stricter conditions of the intellectual property right by
acting in unfair competition instead.
Conclusion
In the United Kingdom and Ireland, it is not possible to protect a database
protected by the sui generis right against parasitism. Hence, there is no issue
of simultaneous over-protection. In France, while the vast majority of courts
and commentators believe that parasitism is not a distinct act, a few courts
nevertheless allow the cumulation of actions and repair the same damage
twice. Thus, simultaneous over-protection is possible, although rare. Even if
the statutory law makes clear that there can be no choice between the unfair
competition action against parasitism and the infringement action, courts
allow this option in many cases. This leads to over-protection because the
intellectual property holder can bypass the stricter conditions of the sui generis
right by acting in unfair competition instead. Another reason is that it renders
the sui generis right useless; there is no need to resort to it since the unfair
competition for parasitism absorbs it.
In Belgium, as in France, databases can only be protected by unfair compe-
tition if a distinct act of unfair competition occurs. However, there is disagree-
ment on what such an act is, leaving the possibility open for courts to cumulate
the two actions. In addition, and which is worse, the law seems to allow a
choice between the action en cessation and infringement action, thereby
rendering the sui generis right useless.
In conclusion, in the United Kingdom and Ireland, there is no simultaneous
over-protection of databases, while in France and Belgium, it is possible. This
also proves that there is a lack of harmonisation in Europe in this respect. To
avoid over-protection of databases, the Database Directive should be amended
to make clear that the sui generis right has absorbed parasitism as far as data-
bases are concerned. Failure to do so leads to the recovery of extra damages
in contradiction to the intellectual property paradigm. In addition, it should
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also provide that there is no choice between the unfair competition for para-
sitism and the infringement actions. In other words, if the sui generis right is
infringed, the claimant is obliged to introduce an infringement action. This
safeguards its rights to claim under other unfair competition counts such as
misleading advertising, disparagement etc. French and Belgian laws should
also be amended to respect those changes.
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